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 Executive summary 
Germany is currently Europe’s leading manufacturing exporter, therefore; its industrial 
model may contain important lessons for other advanced industrial nations coming to 
terms with the aftermath of the ‘Great Recession’. This report analyses the German 
manufacturing sector from the analytical perspective of the three markets in capitalism 
(capital, labour and product markets); examines how they operate; what the role of 
policies and institutions has been in those; and assesses their medium and long-term 
viability.  
 
Perhaps the principal conclusion of interest to policymakers is that the German state has 
a fairly limited role in directing industrial development. Government operates in an 
‘enabling’, rather than strategic, capacity in industry by supporting key institutions, such 
as the training system and underwriting company loans. Instead, intra-sectoral networks 
of companies, trade unions, banks and technical institutions play the lead role in 
coordinating economic activity, and it is the depth and quality of this interaction, together 
with the micro-economic institutions supporting this, which is responsible for the country’s 
manufacturing success.   
 
German manufacturing firms dominate many high-value market niches, particularly 
automobiles and semi-customisable machine tools, however; they are not immune to 
competition from low-wage emerging economies and recent years have seen many 
large, internationally-oriented firms detach themselves from the domestic institutional 
framework. In doing so, they risk undermining Germany’s vaunted ‘Mittlestand’ SME 
sector. The system as a whole is also vulnerable to rigidities. These include: high wages, 
long employee tenure; an inability to move into high-tech, radically innovative product 
market sectors; and with decision-making structures that give voice to many potential 
stakeholders in the company. On the other hand, the system has proven remarkably 
resilient, as well as successful, and empirical evidence presented here shows it is far 
from redundant. 
 
The report also offers some tentative policy suggestions for the UK, while at the same 
time warning of the difficulties of supplanting German institutions and policies into the 
more market-oriented UK setting.  
 
Synopsis 
 
Introduction: Outline of the paper, together with a brief introductory of recent 
developments in industrial policy in Germany. 
 
Finance: Germany’s ‘hausbank’ system and its provision of long-term ‘patient’ capital is 
described and evaluated, and the role of state-backed industry banks such as the KfW is 
also examined. 
 
Labour Markets and Skills: Co-ordinated wage bargaining and industrial democracy, 
giving employees and other stakeholders a key role in company decisions, plays a key 
part in the German production system. As well as ensuring industrial peace, the long-
term relationships which ensue incentivize firms and workers to embark on high-quality 
technical and vocational training.     
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Firm coordination and innovation strategies: The manufacturing sector is underpinned by 
a range of institutions promoting ‘strategic’ (i.e. non-market) interaction between firms 
and other agents. This supports an innovation process that allows for steady, 
‘incremental’ improvements to product lines, resulting in high quality. 
 
Complementarities in the German manufacturing sector: This section examines how the 
country’s manufacturing system functions as a whole. The success of the model is 
underpinned by the presence of a set of mutually complementary institutions which 
produce an outcome that is superior to the sum of its parts.    
 
Future trajectories: The challenges to the model arising from financial globalization and 
competition from low-wage economies are examined and evaluated, as well as 
endogenously-generated tensions within the system itself.  
 
Are there lessons for UK Policymakers? The organization of the UK and German 
economies differ significantly in that activity in the former is coordinated primarily through 
markets, whereas German firms also benefit from collaborative networks that produce 
non-market coordination. Any attempt to ‘borrow’ German policies needs to recognize 
this, although there may be scope for limited institution-building.    
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 1. Introduction 
German manufacturing success has been the envy of many OECD economies. Even in 
the dark years of low growth after unification in 1991, German exports of goods grew 
significantly, both in absolute terms and expressed as world share of exports. It should 
therefore not come as a surprise that many economies have attempted to emulate the 
policies that underpinned this success: France under President Mitterrand did so in the 
early 1980s (Levy 1999), MIT’s Productivity Commission in the late 1980s invoked 
German industrial prowess (Dertouzos et al. 1989), and many Central European 
economies considered the German model as a possible example of sustainable 
capitalism early in the transition period. Today, with Germany seemingly at its export 
apex again, interest in the policies and institutions underlying German manufacturing 
(export) success has been growing everywhere, including the UK. This is not particularly 
surprising, given Germany’s superior manufacturing export performance over the last 14 
years, both as a proportion of trade in (Figure 1) and in money terms (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1: Trade balance in manufacturing 
 
 
Source: OECD STAN indicators 2009 
6 
The German manufacturing sector unpacked: institutions, policies and future trajectories
 Figure 2: Export-Import Ratio in manufacturing 
 
 
Source: OECD STAN indicators 2009 
 
The analysis of the policies and institutions underpinning the strength of German 
manufacturing in this report starts with one important observation. Compared with France 
and the UK during the post--‐war era, where the state has played, or at the very least 
attempted to play, a central role in steering the supply--‐side of the economy, Germany has 
witnessed relatively few direct government policies that support manufacturing. The very 
few exceptions are well--‐known – industrial credit through the reconstruction bank KfW, or 
the industrial expertise that the Fraunhofer institutes in applied research offer to local 
companies and beyond, for example – but on the whole, the government has satisfied 
itself with providing framework conditions, leaving the substance of policies to strong 
autonomous employer, business and trade union associations. These frameworks 
worked very well in stable sectors, which rely on well--‐known technologies and experience 
stable, moderate growth. The advent of less predictable sectors such as 
telecommunications, software and biotechnology has raised the question of to what 
extent these relatively dense institutional frameworks work well for these new sectors as 
well. 
 
Overall, however, the German manufacturing system continues to be extremely 
successful, despite what are often seen as problematic elements such as high wages, 
long employee tenure, an inability to move into high--‐tech radical innovation product 
market strategies, and decision--‐making structures that give voice to many potential 
stakeholders in the company. Research by the German Institute of Economic Research 
(DIW) suggests the country has the second largest machine--‐tool and engineering 
industry of all industrialized countries, generating a fifth of total global value--‐added in the 
sector (DIW Economic Bulletin 5, 2012). Econometric analysis indicates that the rapid 
rebound in Germany’s export market share after 2000 owed to a combination of its 
success in building trade relationships with emerging economies; but also a prolonged 
effort in containing costs through wage moderation, negotiated through Germany’s 
coordinated wage bargaining system (Germany in the Globalisation Process, 
Bundesbank Monthly Report, December 2006; Danninger and Joutz 2007). The German 
manufacturing sector also provides significantly more employment than in the UK. 
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Table 1: Total Employment in Manufacturing in millions  
(OECD Economic Surveys: Germany 2010) 
Germany 7.9 7.75 7.63 7.5 7.45 7.54 7.66 
UK 3.85 3.67 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 
 
The response of German policymakers to the challenges presented by unification after 
1990 illustrates well the indirect and limited nature of state intervention. Debates about 
the country’s poor economic performance in the 1990s, largely conducted between the 
German Council of Economic Experts, European Commission and OECD, focused on 
supply--‐side weaknesses: including labour market rigidities, an inability to exploit new 
technologies and paucity of innovation capacity (cf. ‘Raising Germany’s Growth Potential, 
Occasional paper No 28, DG for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission 
2007). Labour market interventions, culminating in the Hartz reforms of 2002--‐2005, 
increased flexibility at the lower end but – perhaps intentionally --‐   had little effect on the 
core of skilled manufacturing employees (Carlin and Soskice 2008). 
 
Other moves to support technological restructuring centred on beefing up state subsidies 
to nominated growth sectors, such as aerospace and biotechnology, and encouraging 
equity finance through the privatisation of Deutsche Telekom in 1996 and the 
establishment of the Neuer Markt stock market for start--‐ups. These, likewise, produced 
mixed results, with the Neuer Markt collapsing following the dot--‐ com bust of 2000 (Owen 
2012). Although consolidation in the aerospace industry was relatively successful, thanks 
to strong political support, Germany largely failed to incubate the world--‐beating 
biotechnology industry that its policymakers intended (Adelberger 2000). Moreover, large 
areas of the economy, such as the wage bargaining system, saw no little or no 
intervention. 
 
Informed commentators have therefore tended to characterise the state’s role in Germany 
as that of an ‘enabler’, supporting institutions and policies which have a generalised 
impact on industry, rather than enjoying a wider developmental role (Vitols 1996). Even 
the challenges presented by the financial crisis of 2008--‐09 and ensuing global recession 
have not prompted the German government to abandon its hands--‐off, ‘supervisory’ 
stance on industrial policy, neatly summarised by its economic advisory board: ‘The 
state's role in this scheme of things is to act as a strong and neutral arbiter, ensuring that 
market principles are upheld and providing a practical legal framework for restructuring 
the economy’ (German Council of Economic Experts, Annual Report 2009/10). 
 
In this paper on the roots of German manufacturing success, we will use the analytical 
perspective of the three markets in capitalism (capital, labour and product markets – with 
some additional attention to inter--‐firm relations in the case of the latter). We start with an 
examination of how they operate (and to some extent how they differ from other EU 
economies), what the role of policies and institutions has been in them, and assess their 
medium and long--‐term viability. The first section deals with the organization of the capital 
market and its impact on governance structures, the second with the institutions 
governing the labour market and the third with innovation strategies. Sections 4, 5 and 6 
analytically dissect the functioning of the German system as a whole, and evaluate the 
future of the system as well as the lessons that can be learned for the UK. 
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 2. Industrial finance in Germany 
In all capitalist economies, sources of industrial finance come in three types: retained 
earnings, bank loans and equity. Until very recently, the dominant modes of industrial 
finance in Germany were, in descending order, retained corporate earnings and bank 
loans. Even when shares were issued, these were often distributed through a preferential 
arrangement involving one particular bank – the hausbank (house bank). Individual 
shareholders among the public at large could, in principle, only buy company shares with 
that bank, and the bank would hold them collectively in trust for all small shareholders, 
which gave the bank, as the proxy voter for all these shares, a large voice in company 
affairs. 
 
The German ‘stakeholder’ system of finance and corporate governance has worked very 
well, but primarily for large firms in Germany; small and medium sized firms, the 
backbone of Germany’s export industry – the so--‐called Mittelstand – have secured 
access to finance through a system primarily based on local savings banks (Sparkassen). 
Along with co--‐operative banks, the Sparkassen provide about two--‐ thirds of all lending to 
Mittelstand companies and 43% of lending to all companies and households (Economist, 
November 10th 2012). Above this structure of local banks sit the regional Landesbanken, 
which act as wholesale banks for the savings banks and can also provide more 
sophisticated services, such as hedging and offshore financing. 
 
Finally, the state sponsors several public and quasi--‐public institutions charged with 
supporting long--‐term lending. For example, the Industrielkreditbank (IKB) specialises in 
direct loans to manufacturing firms of between 100 and 500 employees; while the 
Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (DtA) encourages business start--‐ups through loan and equity 
capital assistance programs. 
 
However, the best known of these is the state--‐owned Reconstruction Loan Corporation, 
or Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau  Bankengruppe    (KfW), a public law institution which was 
established after WWII explicitly to compensate for the short--‐ termist lending policies of 
the major commercial banks. The KfW has had two principal functions in the post WWII 
era. First, it orchestrates capital market funding for a range of larger industrial and 
developmental projects through issuance of state--‐ guaranteed bonds. The bank has been 
used as a strategic tool for reorganising declining sectors e.g. the steel and ship--‐building 
industries in the 1970s and 1980s, which were rapidly modernised and had excess 
capacity stripped out. 
 
Secondly, the KfW refinances banks with established relationships with Mittelstand firms; 
these are provided with capital at the cost available to publicly--‐listed companies at fixed 
rates of long duration, up to twenty years in some cases. 
 
Applications for loans from the KfW are typically made through the firm’s hausbank, 
which assumes the default risk but is spared the interest rate risk as the loan is 
refinanced by the KfW. In conjunction with the Technology Participation Company, or 
Technologie--‐Beteiligungsgesellschaft (TBG), the KfW was also instrumental in creating 
the German venture capital industry largely from scratch during the 1990s (Martin et al 
2003). KfW lending totalled €70bn in 2010 (KfW Annual Report 2011). A new focus for 
the KfW is funding green projects, spending €25.3bn on them in 2010 (FT, November 28th 
2012). 
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 However, the KfW has been criticised for poor oversight in connection with its 2001 
acquisition of a one--‐third stake in IKB Deutsche Industriebank – a key Mittelstand lender 
which had to be bailed out after transferring €300m to Lehman Bros. on the day it 
collapsed in September 2008 (Economist, 22nd April 2010). Suspicions have also been 
aroused over its acquisition of a 15% stake in the Airbus consortium, EADS, in late 2012 
in order to bring the German government’s shareholding up to that of the French --‐   
sparking fears over it becoming embroiled in a more dirigiste industrial strategy and 
possible politicisation (Economist, 3rd November 2012). 
 
How effective are these quasi--‐public institutions in compensating for market failures in the 
provision of capital? Vitols has suggested that the decentralised German system has 
helped to support a larger SME sector than is the case in other advanced countries, as 
these firms need more help in coping with labour and product market regulation (Vitols 
1996). The state development banks, such as the KfW, help to solve the credit--‐rationing 
problem endemic to SMEs, but without displacing the important monitoring function to 
guard against bad loans which is provided by the hausbanks (Carlin et al 1995). 
 
2.1 Characteristics of the industrial finance system 
The essence of the German system of industrial finance – and a key point of contrast with 
the UK --‐   is a close, long--‐term relationship between manufacturing firms and their banks, 
with equity finance playing a much more limited role. However, it is not just the 
prominence of bank finance that is at issue, but also the character of the relationship. 
German manufacturing firms have access to bank finance that is not typically provided to 
them on the basis of publicly available data or current returns, as is the norm in the UK. 
The hausbank relationship hinges on a two--‐way exchange of inside information between 
banks and firms. The hausbank may simultaneously lend money to the firm, own its 
shares; have seats on its supervisory board and vote at shareholders’ meetings. 
 
The hausbank often provided the president of the board of directors (or, better: its 
German equivalent, the supervisory board, which has representatives of labour as well as 
capital and groups and companies with a stake in the company’s performance, such as 
local and regional governments, or other companies). This presence endows the 
hausbanks with considerable influence over the managerial strategy of the firm and 
provides them with a constant flow of information that allows them to closely monitor the 
value of their investment. As well as close bank--‐ firm involvement, other firms in the 
industry may take directorships on the supervisory boards of firms within their network 
and this is further supported by cross--‐shareholdings and engagement in joint research 
and product development. Hausbanks are also important in funding new business start-
-‐ups, with a third of these reliant on short and long--‐term bank loans. This figure falls only 
slightly by the fifth year of the businesses’ life (KfW/ZEW Startup Panel 2012). 
 
Another key feature of the stakeholder system is ownership concentration. A relatively 
high proportion of German firms are family--‐owned; in others, it is common for a single 
major shareholder, perhaps a bank, to hold a dominant, blocking stake. Pyramidal 
ownership – where a dominant shareholder is able to exercise control of one company 
through the ownership of another – is also commonplace. Table 2 below, using data 
collated by Enriques and Volpin (2007) illustrates these characteristics in a comparative 
context. 
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 Table 2: Ownership Concentration of firms (Enriques and Volpin 2007) 
 Widely held Family control Pyramid 
control 
Median largest 
voting block 
France 60% 20% 15% 20% 
Germany 50% 10% 20% 57% 
Italy 20% 15% 20% 55% 
UK 100% 0% 0% 10%  
USA 80% 20% 0% 5% 9% 
 
The main drawback of these arrangements is that company policy may remain opaque to 
those on the outside of the network, and there is a heightened risk that insiders will focus 
on their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders (Baums and Scott 2005). 
The system is also risk--‐averse and may hinder the reallocation of capital to new business 
start--‐ups. 
 
However, it is crucial in fostering the long--‐term investment horizons which underpins high-
-‐quality production strategies. This is because firms are integrated into networks of 
partners that help to insulate them from hostile takeovers by other companies (Faccio 
and Lang 2002). Managers are able to calculate profit and loss over a longer period of 
time, ironing out fluctuations in the business cycle that might otherwise deter investment. 
The absence of an active market for corporate control (takeovers etc.) also means 
workers are incentivised to acquire high levels of firm--‐ specific technical skills, and the 
careful, incremental, approach to innovation that is a characteristic of German 
manufacturing firms is also supported. 
 
However, for these networks to function effectively, reputation is key. The (future) viability 
of business plans rests on a (past) reputation for veracity and straight--‐ dealing with 
suppliers and customers. Sanctions for providing false information may include exclusion 
from the network and loss of access to its benefits. Reputational monitoring is provided 
through three mechanisms: a) the relationships with suppliers and clients; b) the 
knowledge secured from networks of cross--‐ shareholdings; c) membership of industry 
associations that share information about training, standard setting and technology 
transfer (Vitols et al 1997). 
 
The high level of bank--‐firm coordination in Germany provides a particularly sharp contrast 
with the organisation of business in the UK. Firms in the UK interact with each other, and 
with their suppliers and providers of finance, primarily through market relationships 
underpinned by a much more pro--‐competition regulatory system. Information about firm 
strategy and performance is relayed to investors and others through public channels. 
Firms interact with banks primarily as a means to raise capital --‐   or they tap into the equity 
markets --‐   and the result is an arguably more short--‐termist approach to investment and 
product market strategy. An illustration of this is that the private equity industry is much 
less developed in Germany, accounting for just 0.44% of GDP in 2008 (against 1.03% in 
the UK and 0.64% in France, according to the German Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association (BVK). 
 
Nevertheless, the ‘Anglo--‐Saxon’ model of industrial finance and corporate governance is 
appealing to the top tier of German firms and financial institutions, and the German 
‘stakeholder’ model has been subject to many of the same pressures that have faced the 
UK, namely the internationalisation of finance and growth in importance of institutional 
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 investors and venture capital. A series of corporate governance reforms were set in 
motion in the 1990s with the aim of fostering capital market development and diluting 
insider control, culminating in publication of the German Corporate Governance Code in 
2002 which clarified minority shareholders’ rights. This was bolstered by developments at 
the EU level intended to enhance investor confidence by clamping down on insider 
trading (Noack and Zetsche 2005). 
 
German savings banks themselves have also been forced to change their strategies as a 
result of a wave of disintermediation in the 1990s. Disintermediation occurs when savers 
place money with non--‐bank financial institutions to boost returns and firms find that 
issuing debt to savers or non--‐banks may be cheaper than borrowing from banks. Some 
large German banks are increasingly disengaging themselves from industry in order to 
pursue international opportunities. The reorientation towards investment banking 
activities has also eroded the diversification advantages to banks of owning block-
-‐holdings in industry as close ties with industrial companies are potential barriers to 
generating deals with competitors (Höpner and Krempel 2004). For example, Deutsche 
Bank, which used to own large stakes in firms in sectors as diverse as insurance, car 
manufacturing and food processing, has now entirely unwound these cross-
-‐shareholdings (The Economist, February 3rd 2011). 
 
For their part, some large manufacturing companies are seeking to bear down on costs 
by re--‐locating production to cheaper locations, for which they look to international capital 
markets rather than loans from their hausbank (Lütz 2000). In doing this they inevitably 
encounter investors who are primarily interested in shareholder value, rather than the 
broader needs of stakeholders. The takeover of Mannesman by Vodafone in 2000 may 
have been exceptional, but it also demonstrated the potential vulnerability of even major 
German firms to hostile takeovers. This threat has arguably influenced the strategic 
decisions of some companies: for example Hoechst, which sold its chemical businesses 
in order to focus on pharmaceuticals; and the merger of Daimler--‐Chrysler. 
 
Some analysts therefore argue that Germany’s finance and corporate governance system 
now resembles a hybrid of a traditional stakeholder system meshing with increasingly 
important elements of the shareholder model (Odenius 2008). Nevertheless, there are 
plenty of indications that the continued absence of a genuine market for corporate control 
reduces the likelihood that the stakeholder core of German capitalism will be fatally 
undermined (Goergen et al 2008). So far only the top tier of the more globally oriented 
sections of finance and industry has been heavily affected, and there is a debate over 
whether even these are fleeing or merely exporting the German industrial model 
(Dörrenbächer 2004). 
 
Moreover, the majority of SMEs still prefer to maintain the classic hausbank relationship 
with savings banks and credit co--‐operatives. Bank lending to the private non--‐household 
sector has held up well, despite a general tightening of credit conditions since 2008 
(Deutsche Bundesbank Annual Report, 2011). German SMEs are still significantly more 
likely to hold bank loans (54%) than those in the UK (25%) (AXA International Small 
Business Report, 2012). 
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A detailed examination of recent corporate ownership and governance data for OECD 
countries by Carlin finds only limited evidence of a fundamental erosion of the 
stakeholder model of finance. Company restructuring continues to be negotiated within a 
broadly unchanged structure of control which is entirely consistent with the strong 
improvements in export competitiveness noted elsewhere in this paper– i.e. it did not 
result from rearguard action by vested interests to block change, which would have been 
detrimental to company performance (Carlin 2009). Focusing on international mutual and 
hedge funds, Goyer has also noted a marked preference for these to take stakes in 
French over German firms because the greater degree of management autonomy in the 
former meshes better with their short--‐term strategies (Goyer 2007). 
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 3. Labour markets and skills 
German manufacturing firms operate an industrial system known as Diversified Quality 
Production (DQP). This term describes a product strategy which applies the techniques of 
volume production to high quality product lines (Streeck 1992). Workers in DQP systems 
enjoy substantial autonomy, which they are encouraged to use to make incremental 
improvements to production processes. DQP systems are therefore vulnerable to hold--‐up 
problems, such as strikes and lockouts, and hence require extremely good labour 
relations to function. Firms operating DQP strategies also require a reliable supply of 
workers equipped with a high level of industry--‐ specific technical skills. This section deals 
with each of these concepts in turn. 
 
3.1 Wage bargaining and industrial democracy 
Bargaining over wages and other matters in Germany is generally conducted at the 
industry or sectoral level but is underpinned at the firm/shop floor level by a system of 
industrial democracy which fosters a more coordinated and consensual approach to 
industrial relations than is evident in the UK. 
 
This so--‐called ‘dual’ system of industrial relations is responsible for facilitating negotiated 
adjustment, so firm and industry restructuring in response to the changing competitive 
environment is more likely to take place in a consensual manner, reducing the risk of 
industrial unrest. The dual system rests on institutional foundations of strong, centralized 
trade unions and employer’s associations, organized along sectoral, rather than craft, 
lines. This is underpinned by a statutory system of plant level worker representation, 
operating through autonomous works councils, which have legal authority to enforce 
collective agreements. 
 
Workers are also represented on the supervisory boards of Germany companies in a 
system known as ‘co--‐determination’ (Mitbestimmung). Co--‐determination is legally 
guaranteed by: the Co--‐Determination Act of 1976, which guarantees equal representation 
of employees; and the Works Constitution Act, which was amended in 2001, and governs 
collaboration between staff, works councils, unions and employee’s associates. While 
formally separate from the unions, the works councils nevertheless help to shore up 
unions’ bargaining strength at higher levels (Thelen 2001). 
 
A particular contrast with the UK is that German employers are significantly more 
organized than British firms. A division of labour exists between the Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Industrie (BDI), which deals with political lobbying and is the functional 
equivalent of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), and the employers association 
Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA). The latter coordinates 
the economic and collective bargaining activities of its industrial and regional members, 
and for which no UK counterpart exists. The proportion of German employers which are 
members of these associations – the employer organisation density --‐   was 63% in 2007 
(European Commission 2009). 
 
The German government plays a minimal role in industrial bargaining, besides setting out 
the legal and institutional framework in which it takes place. The conduct of wage 
bargaining in the German system has a number of specific characteristics. As already 
noted, it is both more centralized and coordinated than in the UK (where it takes place at 
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 the level of the plant, team or individual worker), although less so than in Sweden or 
Austria (where national or inter--‐sectoral bargaining is more commonplace). Bargaining 
often consists of pilot agreements whereby a lead negotiator, usually the powerful 
metalworkers union IG Metal, secures agreement with its counterpart employer 
association, Gesamtmetal, establishing the basis of wage deals across the rest of the 
manufacturing sector. 
 
Union density in Germany, at 20%, is actually less than the UK, where 27% of workers 
are members of unions, according to the labour research organisation, the Hans Böckler 
Stiftung. However, the bargaining coverage of German unions significantly exceeds their 
actual membership, due to the coordinating capacities of unions. In 2007, about 56% of 
all employees in western Germany and 41% of employees in eastern Germany were 
covered by sectoral collective agreements, although the level has fallen by about 10% 
since the late 1990s. Company--‐level agreements covered 7% of employees in western 
Germany and 13% of employees in eastern Germany, according to Germany’s Institute 
for Employment Research. 
 
Such coordination results in a low level of wage dispersion (the spread between high and 
low earners), encouraging firms to coordinate with each other over the production of a 
range of industry--‐wide public goods, such as a high level of firm and industry--‐specific 
technical training (see below), as it reduces the ability of firms to free ride on the training 
efforts of others by offering higher wages to poach staff. Reflecting its more ‘rigid’ labour 
market, the labour reallocation rate is significantly lower in Germany than in the UK and 
other countries with ‘flexible’ labour markets (OECD Germany Survey 2010: 49). 
However, the OECD has also praised the workings of the German labour market, drawing 
attention to the role of active measures, such as working time accounts and short--‐term 
work schemes, in maintaining employment in manufacturing following the financial crisis 
(OECD Germany Survey 2012: 10--‐11). 
 
Some commentators point to a growing incidence of large firms defecting from industry 
wide--‐collective wage agreements and putting pressure on suppliers to cut their prices 
through a wage squeeze, as well as a fall in the number of union affiliations to the DGB, 
as evidence of a crisis in the German industrial relations system (Streeck 2008). A 
number of employers in eastern Germany have stayed out of national employers’ 
associations in order to preserve wage and cost advantages (Silvia 1997). Tension within 
the bargaining system came to a head in an unsuccessful strike in 2003 by IG Metal, 
which had called for a reduction in working hours in the auto industry in East Germany. 
Its failure led to a crisis in the German trade union movement. 
 
In a further indication of stress on the system, in 2005 Gesamtmetal introduced a new tier 
of membership status (OT--‐Status), which does not entail a binding commitment to 
collectively--‐negotiated wage agreements. This predictably led to a fall in the number of 
member firms bound by the sectoral agreements, from 4,189 in 2005 to 3,803 members 
in 2007 in western Germany, while the number not bound by these rose from 1,432 in 
2005 to 2,229 in 2007 in western Germany (European Industrial Relations Observatory). 
The number of unions affiliated to the DGB has declined from 16 in the 1980s to eight 
currently, although this is partly the result of mergers and that number still includes 
Europe’s largest and second largest unions, the service sector VER.DI as well as IG 
Metal. 
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 Overall, the coordinated bargaining system has, because of the beneficial effects it 
produces for large firms, so far defied predictions of its demise and is seen as a key 
ingredient in Germany’s manufacturing export prowess over the last decade, muting 
criticism. 
 
3.2 Vocational skills 
A critical ingredient for success in the quality--‐competitive German manufacturing system 
is a reliable supply of workers with firm and industry--‐specific skills. Such skills are costly 
to provide and acquire and so firms and workers considering investing in such skills rely 
on various assurances against possible skills redundancy, for example technical change 
or firm restructuring. 
 
These assurances are provided by various institutional elements of Modell Deutschland. 
One mechanism for underwriting skills formation is, of course, the German welfare 
system, which provides a high level of wage compensation as well as few strictures on 
the type of job the claimant is required to take (Estevez--‐Abe et al 2001). Concern over 
high unemployment and labour market ‘dualism’ has prompted several attempts to 
overhaul the welfare system, culminating in the ‘Hartz’ I--‐IV reforms of 2002--2005. Pre-
-‐Hartz, active labour market policies (ALMP) were geared towards training and job 
creation that worked to maintain the occupational status of those in work while doing little 
for poverty alleviation (Jacobi and Kluve 2006). Hartz IV – the most far--‐reaching set of 
measures --‐   redesigned the benefits system and placed more emphasis on the ‘rights and 
duties’ of claimants. 
 
Yet many commentators claim these measures actually entrench dualism, as they do little 
to encourage cross--‐sectoral re--‐training of older and under--‐skilled workers and thereby 
serve to reinforce the position of skilled workers in core manufacturing export sectors 
(Carlin and Soskice 2008; Palier and Thelen 2010; Huo 2009). 
 
Although Hartz eased restrictions on agency workers, these are still entitled to the same 
pay and conditions as full--‐time staff and there is little indication of any significant labour 
market effect outside the seasonal and service sectors (Ebinghaus and Eichhorst 2006). 
While firms regularly express concerns about labour market issues, the fragmented 
nature of the political system and weak and divided peak business associations (as 
opposed to the well--‐organised sectoral level) has prevented the emergence of a broad 
coalition of employers to push for comprehensive reform (Martin and Swank 2012). 
 
Germany's centralized wage bargaining system, discussed above, plays an important role 
in underwriting the skills system by providing negotiated wage protection. Coordinated 
bargaining reduces the chances that the wage levels for specific skills will decline in 
future, increasing the returns to workers making the effort to acquire a high level of firm 
and sector specific skills. From the perspective of employers, wage coordination across 
the sector also reduces the risk that expensively--‐trained workers will be poached by rival 
firms who choose to free--‐ride on the training efforts of others (Thelen 2000). The German 
system also provides assurances to trainees that firms will not renege on their training 
commitments and exploit them as cheap labour, thanks to a well structured regulatory 
framework and monitoring institutions. Where these guarantees are absent, as in the UK, 
the system becomes vulnerable to low uptake as legal training contracts by themselves 
may be unenforceable (Dustmann and Schönberg 2012). 
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 The education and vocational training system in Germany is overseen by industry--‐ wide 
employer associations and unions administering a publicly subsidized training system. 
The system negotiates industry--‐wide skills categories and training protocols and provides 
numerous apprentices to manufacturing firms. At the core of the German system of 
industrial skills provision is the ‘dual’ vocational training system, in which training usually 
lasts for three years. Around 70% of school leavers in vocational pathways learn an 
official state--‐registered trade through this system (A Learning for Jobs Review of 
Germany, OECD 2010). Every school leaver who has completed full time education has 
access to dual vocational training. The dual element of the training lies in the fact that the 
training path takes place in two places of learning: the company and the vocational 
training school. 
 
This equips the trainees with both a basic technical understanding of the subject while 
showing them how this knowledge should be applied in the workplace. Successful 
completion of the training entails professional accreditation as a skilled employee, and 
the German Chambers of Commerce and Industry, as well as business associations and 
training institutions, provide opportunities for more advanced training and hold 
examinations for recognized qualifications (see next section). 
 
Large firms often take on more trainees than they need, with the tacit understanding that 
the excess trainees can go on to seek jobs with firms in their supplier networks. 
 
The advantages of the dual system are its ability to furnish trainees with a high degree of 
technical and practical competence, while the close involvement of employers in an 
essentially demand--‐led system ensures the relevance of the training to their market 
requirements. The labour market overall achieves a high degree of match between skill 
level and occupation, with international surveys showing only 18% of German workers 
consider themselves over--‐qualified for their jobs compared with an OECD average of one 
in four (OECD Employment Outlook 2011). 
 
Among the system’s disadvantages are its occasional inflexibility and an inability to forge 
close links with universities. Over the last decade manufacturing firms have found it more 
difficult to fill apprenticeship places, due to their increasing skill demands as well as a rise 
in the number of young people choosing to go to university instead, resulting in a fall in 
the average PISA attainments of technical apprentices. This raises the training cost for 
each recruit, prompting increasing numbers of smaller firms to defect from training 
arrangements, particularly in the east (Steedman 2005). Data covering the period 1980 to 
2006 shows a decline in demand for apprentices from the industrial sectors and a rise in 
service type occupations. Industry still provides some 40% of all apprenticeships, but this 
is down from 50% in 1980 (Steedman 2010). The Federal government and Länder are 
trying to address this by devising ‘transition’ arrangements between schools and the VET 
programs, such as ‘pre--‐apprenticeships’ (Review of Vocational and Academic Training: A 
Learning for Jobs Review of Germany, OECD 2010). 
 
The German training system contrasts with the UK, where workers are incentivized to 
acquire a set of general skills, as the UK’s flexible labour markets provide fewer wage 
and occupational guarantees. The lack of specific skills training arguably entails large 
sections of UK industry becoming trapped in a ‘low--‐wage, low--‐skills equilibrium’, obliging 
them to pursue price--‐competitive product strategies as the lack of supportive institutions 
largely closes off the DQP path (Finegold and Soskice 1993). This could create problems 
for the future. Recent forecasts for EU countries indicate that most new jobs will be 
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created in the knowledge and skills--‐intensive occupations, while job numbers will fall for 
skilled manual workers (Cedefop 2010).
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 4. Firm co-ordination and innovation 
strategies 
German manufacturing firms excel in the production of sophisticated engineering 
products requiring the deployment of long--‐term, patient capital and a highly skilled, co-
-‐operative labour force. Firms tend to specialize in well--‐established but relatively complex 
production processes and offer extensive after sales service with long--‐term links with 
customers. Examples of manufacturing sectors dominated by German firms include 
machine tools, engineering, engines, consumer ‘white goods’, cars and materials 
processing. 
 
The ability to pursue quality--‐competitive DQP--‐type product strategies is underpinned by a 
range of institutions promoting ‘strategic’ (i.e. non--‐market) interaction between firms and 
other agents. This supports an innovation process that allows for steady, ‘incremental’ 
improvements to product lines. These elements of the German model are discussed 
below. 
 
4.1 Innovation strategies 
Incremental innovation is defined as ‘competence--‐preserving’, in that the product line is 
improved and upgraded, rather than deliberately rendered obsolete in order to explore 
new market opportunities. Incremental innovation tends to be more important for 
maintaining competitiveness in the production of capital goods, such as machine tools, 
where the challenge is to maintain the high quality of an established product line while 
devising piecemeal improvements to maintain quality control and hold down costs. 
Incremental innovation is often contrasted with the ‘radical’ innovation strategies pursued 
by many British and American firms, particularly in hi--‐technology sectors. Radical 
innovation is ‘competence--‐destroying’, in that firms may innovate themselves out of their 
previous tasks in order to seek out new product niches. 
 
The close association of radical innovation with Schumpeterian processes of ‘creative 
destruction’, assumed to lie at the heart of any dynamic capitalist economy, has led some 
academic observers to conclude that the German model is exhausted and set to be 
eclipsed (Streeck 2008). The paltry returns to the substantial investments made by the 
Kohl government in an attempt to create thriving German software and biotechnology 
sectors is often seen as evidence of an ‘innovation crisis’ in the country (Adelberger 
2000). The OECD has criticised the fact that innovation is ‘…concentrated in fields of 
traditional strength on export markets’, with less activity devoted to hi--‐tech sectors than 
Germany’s competitors (Improving the Capacity to Innovate. OECD Economic Surveys: 
Germany. OECD 2004: 117). Nevertheless, German technology firms have prospered in 
niche areas where they can specialize in broad ‘platform’ technologies, such as business 
software services (Caspar, Lehrer, Soskice 2009). 
 
Moreover, spending on Research and Development (R&D) by German manufacturing 
firms remains extremely high. In 2010, R&D spending in manufacturing was €46.9bn, 
which equates to almost 86% percent of the private economy’s total R&D expenditure, 
according to the Federal Statistical Office (Cost Structure Survey for Enterprises in the 
Manufacturing Sector 2009). R&D spending has increased steadily since 2000, by an 
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 annual average of 3.8%, according to the German Institute of Economic Research 
(‘Research--‐based Firms Perform Better’, DIW Economic Bulletin 2012). The Federal 
government subsidizes R&D activity, to the tune of €1.9bn in 2010, and this was stepped 
up dramatically following the financial crisis as private sector R&D stalled. A ‘High--‐Tech 
Strategy’, launched in 2006, funnels significant funding to industry and includes 
institutional reforms to help start--‐ups, for example by amending the law on limited liability 
companies (‘The High--‐Tech Strategy’, Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 
2006). 
 
Since research--‐intensive firms enjoy considerably higher productivity than firms that do 
less research, these R&D efforts make an important contribution to Germany’s 
spectacular performance in key manufacturing export markets. Nevertheless, the OECD 
has been critical of the reliance on direct government subsidies to support private sector 
R&D, and suggests a switch of emphasis to tax credits (‘Structural Reforms to Lift 
Potential Growth in a Globalised World’, OECD 2010). 
 
German manufacturing firms innovate by systematically exploiting particular technologies 
in a variety of high value--‐added product niches. Much innovation is undertaken inside the 
firm by groups of workers with a high degree of technical skill who are endowed with 
considerable operational autonomy and take responsibility for specific tasks. An example 
is the system of ‘quality circles’ in the auto industry, pioneered in Japan, where teams 
engaged on the production line suggest and implement improvements to production 
processes largely independent of senior managers. This system requires extremely good 
labour relations, as so much innovatory activity is bound up in the ‘tacit’ (i.e. non-
-‐codifiable) knowledge held by employees and spread across networks of technicians, 
managers and scientists. Workers are therefore employed on long--‐term contracts and 
they also have considerable input into the management and strategic direction of the firm 
(see Section Two). 
 
This tends to inhibit the pursuit of more high--‐risk innovation activity prevalent in faster-
-‐moving sectors of cutting edge technology. However, continued German domination of 
high--‐quality product niches, in which DQP strategies mesh with its pattern of institutional 
comparative advantage, indicates that the model is far from exhaustion. 
 
4.2 Firm co-ordination 
As well as effectively harnessing the input of their employees, German manufacturing 
firms exist within dense inter--‐corporate networks offering collectively--‐provided public 
goods that support incremental innovation. 
 
As already noted, businesses in Germany are much more highly organized than those in 
the UK. Firms co-ordinate horizontally and vertically with others in the same sector over 
wage bargaining, technology transfer and diffusion within the industry; technical norm 
setting; training--‐standard setting and technical training. DQP manufacturing strategies, in 
fact, hinge on the ability of firms to develop relational contracts with other firms – 
including suppliers, customers and competitors – in order to participate in joint 
development, modification and customisation of machines and processes through 
technological exchange. Such collaborative frameworks create important information 
externalities for firms which would be extremely costly to provide individually (Ulrich 
1995). 
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 These activities may involve the exchange of internal, commercially sensitive information 
between firms competing in the same market. Independent monitoring of these 
exchanges is therefore extremely important to ensure fairness. This activity is undertaken 
by a range of organizations, including banks and professional engineering associations, 
as well as Chambers of Commerce, Industrie und Handelskammertage (IHK). 
 
The IHKs are entirely private sector funded and underpinned by compulsory membership 
in a system of public law. Germany also has a ‘craft’ chambers system, 
Handwerkskammer (HwK), with 53 member chambers, and a network of 117 overseas 
chambers to support exporters. These associations are tied together into a well organized 
national framework, as most aspects of vocational training, employee representation and 
technology standards are normally governed by framework legislation enacted by central 
or regional government. The IHKs, for example, are coordinated at the national level by 
an umbrella body, the Deutschen Industrie und Handelskammertages (German 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, or DIHK), which liaises with the economics 
ministry over industrial strategy. The DIHK has 80 member chambers, representing 3 
million individual members. 
 
Central government, however; plays an enabling, rather than interventionist, role in 
technology and innovation policy, for example by setting a framework for technology 
transfer through publicly--‐funded research institutes and universities. Much industrial and 
technical--‐oriented research is conducted outside the firm by a variety of university and 
non--‐university research institutions. The latter group includes: the Max Planck 
Gesellschaft (for basic research); the Helmholtz Gesellschaft Deutscher 
Forschungszentren (for the development of key technologies); and the Fraunhofer 
Gesellschaft (applied research). The German structure of industrial research specifically 
encourages networks of firms to collaborate on R&D at the pre--‐ competitive stage. It also, 
somewhat in contrast to the UK, explicitly targets support for innovation by SMEs --‐ and in 
both high and medium technology sectors (Rothgang et al 2011). 
 
German firms enjoy broad leeway to cooperate in industry--‐wide standard--‐setting through 
the DIN standard. DIN provides a publicly--‐accepted framework for standards in private 
industry which, because it is not codified in law, is largely immune to state interference. 
The DIN framework is ideally suited to the DQP production system and is used by mass 
and customised producers alike. Building on its success, a ‘fast--‐track’ standard (EBN) for 
high--‐technology industries was created in the 1990s. The rigorous but flexible German 
system is widely--‐admired and arguably stands in contrast to the rather looser, ‘lowest-
-‐common denominator’, UK regime, based on BSI, whose drawbacks have encouraged 
many British firms to seek international standardisation (Tate 2001). 
 
German policymakers understand that markets are frequently highly segmented, with 
firms interacting with a relatively small number of major competitors. Therefore, factors 
such as trust and co-operation can play an important role in competitive success. Inter-
-‐firm interaction is supported by a body of corporate law which is amenable to open-
-‐ended contracts --‐   often characterised as ‘high--‐trust’ legal arrangements. The German 
legal system supports this by permitting a great deal of discretion in guaranteeing the 
confidentiality of commercially sensitive business and market information. As the legal 
standing of German business associations (and trade unions) are explicitly recognised in 
a system of public law, they are encouraged to create private agreements among 
themselves which are then legitimised by the state. 
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The peak industrial employer’s association, the BDI, devotes considerable legal 
resources to enabling member associations to share information and coordinate their 
activities (Casper 2001). Although both UK and German manufacturers collaborate with 
other firms on product innovation, industry surveys reveal very different motives: while UK 
firms emphasise speed to market as a key reason for inter--‐firm collaboration and are 
more likely to sub--‐contract, German firms cite strategic priorities of risk and cost sharing 
and prefer collaborative relationships with rivals (Love and Roper 2004). Analysis of the 
biotechnology (Kaiser and Prange 2004) and pharmaceutical (Casper and Matraves 
2003) industries illustrates how intra--‐ sectoral collaboration on R&D and product 
development support the German system of incremental innovation, although both sets of 
authors acknowledge that this comes at the cost of limiting the ability of firms to adapt 
quickly to changing market conditions. 
 
The government also sets the overriding competitive environment through competition 
policy. Generally, there is a strong requirement for open competition in the export market, 
but some avoidance of head to head competition in sub--‐branches of industry, particularly 
where open competition would militate against collaboration on training and technology 
transfer. An illustration of this is that the World Economic Forum ranks Germany 24th in 
the world for ‘effectiveness of anti--‐ monopoly policy’ – the UK is in 9th place (Global  
Competitiveness Report 2012--‐13).
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 5. Complementarities in the German 
manufacturing sector 
Having examined the institutional governance arrangements of each of the key 
constituent markets, and their difference from standard arrangements in the UK, one final 
key dimension needs to be explored: the tightness of their interrelations – the ‘systemic’ 
nature of the German manufacturing system – and the consequences of these 
interrelations. How, in other words, do the different institutional arrangements 
underpinning the German manufacturing industry work as an integrated system? 
 
5.1 Institutional complementarities 
The key concept in this regard, which helps us understand how the different sub--‐ systems 
are mutually articulated, is that of institutional complementarities: two institutions are said 
to have positive complementarity--‐type effects if their joint presence increases the overall 
efficiency of the system – even if each of the sub--‐ systems may be in what appears prima 
facie to be a sub--‐optimal position (highly regulated labour markets with centrally co--‐
ordinated wage bargaining, for example). 
 
Long--‐term investors such as banks, but possibly also conservative pension funds, are 
usually very willing to invest in the sustained provision of specific skills for workers and 
they will easily accept that regulated labour markets are a useful way of doing so. 
Nervous institutional investors such as mutual funds, in contrast, are very reluctant to sink 
capital into a long--‐term training project with uncertain (and often even longer--‐term) pay-
-‐offs, which ties their capital to the effort and skills of workers. 
 
Crucially, once labour and product markets are linked in such systemic ways, the range 
of options for a company – and by extension all companies in the economy – in terms of 
the strategies adopted toward product markets is considerably narrower as well. Building 
machine tools in a competitive way, for example, requires that both employer and 
employee invest in skills that further a deep knowledge of the technology deployed and of 
the type of customers that would want to buy such complex capital goods. Specific skills 
and long--‐term capital are combined, in other words, in ways that produce important 
competitive advantages in relatively narrow market niches, where long--‐term, relationship-
-‐specific links between producers and consumers emerge (Amable 2003). Figure 3 below; 
indicates the degree of specialisation in Germany’s manufacturing sector, which is an 
indication of comparative advantage. 
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 Figure 3: Export specialisation relative to total economy 
 
Source: OECD STAN indicators 2009 
 
The presence of several ‘mutually correctly calibrated’ institutions that govern different 
markets thus determines the efficiency of the overall institutional framework. This 
argument for the existence of ‘institutional complementarities’ implies that for a 
framework to have the desired strong effect, the constituent institutions in the different 
markets – between labour relations and corporate governance, labour relations and the 
national training system, and corporate governance and inter--‐firm relations – reinforce 
each other. 
 
In countries such as Germany (and with it much of North--‐West Europe), long--‐term 
employment strategies, rule--‐bound behaviour and the durable ties between firms and 
banks that underpin patient capital provision predispose firms to the kind of ‘incremental 
innovation’ in capital goods industries, machine tools and equipment of all kinds 
characteristic of German manufacturing. The system operates to maximize the mutual 
gains from co--‐specific assets – assets such as skills and technology, which, in contrast to 
generic assets, require each other to realize their potential. 
 
As a result, the links between labour and capital are organized very differently in 
Germany from many other economies. Within companies, both large and small ones, 
workers are involved in operational and strategic decision--‐making at many different 
levels, from the shop floor via works councils and (separately) trade unions to an almost 
equal presence on the supervisory board (roughly equivalent to a Board of Directors). 
 
There are, for the purposes of this paper on the institutional context of powerful German 
manufacturing, two key implications of this notion of institutional complementarities. The 
first is, in a sense, why we direct attention to Germany today. Its institutional make--‐up, 
which is at the basis of sophisticated skills, patient capital, dense inter--‐firm networks, 
resulting in the production of complex medium--‐ tech capital and consumer goods, could 
be construed as ‘comparative institutional advantage’. German manufacturing success is 
the result of this interaction between different sub--‐systems, all guided by the same 
institutional principles, which allow them to move in tandem. 
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 The second question is related to the possibilities of transferring elements of the system 
into economies that operate on fundamentally different principles, e.g. where the state 
plays a larger role in steering investment and credit (as in France, Japan and South 
Korea after WW II), or where transparent market relations prevail in labour and capital 
markets (as in the UK and the USA). Put differently, given the complementarities between 
the institutional arrangements governing different markets, to what extent is institutional 
‘cherry--‐picking’ possible? 
 
There are in principle two very different answers to this question. The first essentially 
precludes such forms of institutional transfer, because it would, in an expansive reading, 
be necessary to transfer not just the element that is desired, but a whole array of 
background conditions and institutions as well – many of which are the product of several 
decades and centuries of adjustment and conflict and, therefore, are not easy to replicate. 
France since the second oil shock and Central Europe since 1989 both give an indication 
of the difficulties of building a new institutional framework that introduced key elements of 
the German system. In both cases, top--‐down emulation of the institutions governing the 
German industrial sectors failed, to a large extent because none of the other supporting 
elements were present: banks had developed weak monitoring capacity or were simply 
non--‐existent in that role, labour unions were weakly organized in companies or absent, 
and local development agencies failed, in the absence of local chambers of commerce 
and similar organizations that aggregate firm interests, to engage firms in a long term, 
strategic way. Building a sophisticated manufacturing system thus depends on the 
existence of several pre--‐existing institutions and organization, which, themselves, are 
built on what we could loosely call proto--‐institutions. 
 
The second answer is more permissive, building on the notion that not all background 
institutions are equally necessary and that functional equivalents might exist for those 
that are. In a careful comparison of German and Swiss institutions, Börsch (2007) 
concludes that the high value--‐added manufacturing associated with both countries might 
be obtained with more liberalised labour markets than had been considered necessary 
from the standard institutionalist perspective (this point is explored in greater detail 
below). 
 
Similarly, Goyer (2007) argues that the disintermediation of capital provision has not 
necessarily led to a collapse of long--‐term, patient capital: pension funds, which require a 
stable, long--‐term return on their investment (as opposed to mutual funds, who operate on 
a considerably shorter time horizon), are disproportionately more active in the German 
economy. 
 
Both these examples suggest that the degrees of freedom are, perhaps, higher than the 
‘tight constraints’ view suggests. However, it is important to bear in mind that both 
Switzerland and Germany under financial globalization have retained many of the proto-
-‐institutional frameworks that support sophisticated product market strategies. Swiss firms 
exhibit a high degree of coordination – much higher than we usually find in countries such 
as France, Italy, or, especially, the UK. And long--‐term institutional investors are, one 
could argue, exploiting this particular comparative advantage of German firms when they 
decide to invest there: there is no need to force German firms to change strategy, since 
short--‐term manufacturing strategies are easy to find elsewhere on the globe. 
 
In sum, we are of the view that institutional complementarities are especially important for 
understanding the success of the German manufacturing sector and that these 
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complementarities have to be seen as more or less hard institutional constraints. They 
may not determine what is possible, but they certainly suggest strategies that are 
impossible because they are incompatible with the underlying institutional framework. 
 
5.2 The Mittelstand 
While large manufacturing firms are responsible a large share of German exports, 
ranging from 30% to over 50% depending on the sector, an equally important part of 
exports is linked to the dense network of small, usually family--‐owned companies 
collectively known as the Mittelstand – literally the ‘middle strata’, although that 
translation hardly does it justice, considering that much of German large--‐scale 
manufacturing would find it hard to survive without them. 
 
These companies are deeply rooted in their local communities, specialise in a single or a 
very small number of high--‐end products, and do that, on the whole, better than most of 
their competitors. They rely on highly skilled workers, who have usually been with the 
company for a long time, and on the apprenticeship system as a source for replenishing 
skills. Their financial situation is such that they attempt to remain out of debt, relying on 
retained earnings for developing future strategies, or tap into a large network of local 
savings banks when the need for extra cash arises. The key component of their success 
is the relentless focus on a small number of high--‐quality products and strong, long--‐term 
links with an end manufacturer (for those who produce intermediate goods) or an 
aggressive international strategy (Streeck 1995). 
 
It is hard to imagine this sector without the institutional framework that underpins the rest 
of the German manufacturing export sector. Like the large firms, they rely on 
apprenticeships for skill formation, peaceful labour relations, with or without the 
cooperation of labour unions but always involving an employee forum such as the local 
works council. When necessary, they also rely, possibly more than large firms, on local 
banks when necessary (Matraves 1997). 
 
As a result of this reliance on key elements of the German institutional framework for 
manufacturing they thrive there, while they usually are a considerably less vibrant part of 
the economy in other large European economies such as France and the UK (the small 
northern European economies often have an industrial structure that mirrors Germany’s, 
reflecting their relatively similar institutional make--‐up). According to the German Chamber 
of Industry and Commerce, the DIHK, there were about 3.5 Million of these firms (with 
fewer than 500 employees) in 2011, employing about 80% of the German industrial 
workforce, and contributing over 50% to German GDP. 
 
Comparable figures for France are hard to come by – not least because France has only 
recently recognised the equivalent of the Mittelstand as a statistical category – but a 
consensus figure is that there are less than half of these types of companies, with a 
similar ratio for employment (which is concentrated in the low 1--‐9 workers segment) and 
turnover, which is hovers between 15% and 20% of GDP (Ernst & Young 2012). 
Importantly, French small firms of this type are often dependent on a small number of 
large firms for whom they act as suppliers and very few have autonomously developed 
export markets. In the UK, SMEs comprise 57% of manufacturing firms, accounting for 
33% of turnover (Business Population Estimates 2012, BIS). 
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6. Future trajectories for German 
manufacturing 
At the moment, in late 2012, there are very few reasons to assume that the German 
manufacturing sector will soon face significant adjustment problems. By all standards, the 
two deep recessions that these sectors faced in the early 1990s and the 2000s were far 
more important in terms of the sense of doom that had conquered the sector: inviting 
disbelief today, German manufacturers and policy makers raised, in both instances, the 
genuine spectre of a dramatic decline of the manufacturing sector. In both these periods, 
adjustment was guided by the institutions that we analysed earlier: the training system 
was revamped, R&D investment beefed up, and employers and trade unions explored 
new elements in the industrial relations system that retained the beneficial elements while 
reducing the negative impact of others. In a sense, the German manufacturing system is 
extremely well--‐equipped to deal with such challenges, based as it is on broad co-
operation among all actors in the economy – banks, employers, firms, labour unions and 
workers. 
 
Figure 4: Export share of manufacturing production 
 
Source: OECD STAN indicators 2009 
 
6.1 Threats to the German manufacturing system 
Yet there are dark clouds on the horizon. Some of these are beyond the direct control of 
employers and labour – the crisis of the euro, for example, skirting a third recession in 
less than six years and heralding anaemic growth across the continent, is bound to affect 
the highly export--‐dependent German manufacturing sectors deeply, especially those that 
concentrate on the EU and wider Europe. Yet, while important, Germany’s export sector 
has, to some extent, neutralised part of that particular threat by turning to markets outside 
the EU, especially. China may be the world’s main exporter, but Germany is building its 
factories and for the time being, as the developing world grows faster, German exports 
will benefit from that process. 
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More problems may reside in the changing socio--‐economic landscape of Germany. 
Higher service employment, lower unionization rates and a dramatic increase in female 
employment will influence the power that manufacturing yields in the political--‐economic 
structure of the country. Employment in the service sectors and (all other things equal) 
female employment have skill profiles that are very different from standard specific--‐skill 
based (predominantly male) manufacturing skill profiles. 
 
The training system may have worked particularly well for manufacturing; however it is 
unclear how well it performs in services, which require relatively low--‐level general skills or 
where skill profiles are shifting faster (as in the ICT sectors) than the relatively slow 
training programmes can accommodate. 
 
The success of German manufacturing depends critically on the (sometimes redundant) 
provision of public goods, of which training is arguably the most important. Over the last 
two decades, however, training efforts of firms have fallen quite dramatically, from over 
700,000 annually in 1992 to below 600,000, reflecting the diminished growth of jobs in the 
manufacturing sectors since the crisis of the early 1990s (and despite the recent growth in 
jobs in the sectors). Whatever the causes, such a reduction leads, as a result to the 
compound effect of systematically lower training numbers, to a smaller pool for 
companies to tap into in the future. 
 
One of the key problems that the German manufacturing sector is likely to face in the 
near to medium future is one of skills. For all the reasons above, numbers of workers and 
companies engaged in vocational and technical training are falling quite rapidly, and good 
jobs are now also found outside the stable manufacturing sector. 
 
In addition, a two to three--‐year training programme is eminently feasible in stable sectors, 
where product innovation is slow (incremental) and builds on existing skills and links with 
suppliers. However, as product life cycles shorten – mainly as a result of newly 
industrializing countries entering the market, such long--‐term training systems invariably 
come under stress. 
 
Both large companies and the Mittelstand thus face a situation in which the production of 
skills will have to be managed more carefully than in the past. If the fall in apprenticeships 
continues, the government, both in Berlin and in the German member--‐states, may be 
asked to play a more active role in skill provision, actively through the provision of training 
centres where the private sector appears unable to produce results, or more passively 
through taxes and subsidies that make such jobs more attractive. 
 
These problems are, to some extent, related. The crisis of the euro can also be seen as a 
crisis of a monetary union with a magnificent export sector in the north that exported to 
the south of the continent, thus exacerbating current account imbalances, budget deficits 
and private debt overhang. The rise of female employment also produces a 
counterbalance to the inherent financial conservatism of German households in the face 
of uncertainty: two incomes reduce the need to save as a shelter against weaker 
employment protection and pensions. And the rise of the service sector is to some extent 
an answer to the increased sophistication of manufacturing processes, which now require 
technical skills beyond the normal levels provided in the vocational training system. 
 
The future of the German manufacturing system is, therefore, far from secure. While the 
biggest threat it faces is probably not the collapse of its export markets as a result of 
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sluggish growth in the developed world, there are a series of related problems that need 
to be addressed. And whereas such adjustment problems could easily find a solution 
within the existing framework in the past, it appears as if the current batch may be harder 
to accommodate within the current framework, precisely because they follow from 
elements that are new and, to some extent alien, to the German export manufacturing 
system. 
 
Because the country is an exporting economy, Germany’s manufacturing sector will 
remain important. As long as the world needs German products and as long as Germany 
can provide those at an affordable price – both assumptions that have held true in the 
past – Germany will find a way to face the coming crisis. However, as a result of 
adjustment processes elsewhere in the economy, Germany’s manufacturing sector might 
be facing a more uncertain environment in terms of skills and finance than it did in the 
past. And it might well be, as we saw with human resources policies instigated to stabilize 
the German labour market during the latest crisis that the government will carefully play a 
more important role, loosely articulated with the existing institutional framework. 
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 7. Are there policy lessons for the UK? 
Despite talk of the death of manufacturing, the UK still possesses many world--‐ beating 
industrial companies, such as Rolls Royce, JCB and GKN. But it also has a large number 
of low--‐value added firms, competing on price rather than quality and highly vulnerable to 
growing competition from low--‐cost developing world producers climbing inexorably up the 
value chain. The German industrial model inevitably offers policy--‐makers here an 
attractive alternative path of adjustment because it offers a model based on high skill 
levels, superior export performance, a long--‐term strategic investment outlook and 
industrial harmony. But are successful elements of the German model transferable to the 
UK? 
 
7.1 Developing co-ordination in an unco-ordinated economy 
UK policymakers have looked abroad previously for policy lessons: French--‐style 
indicative planning was tried in the 1960s; the 1975 Bullock Report suggested moves 
towards co-ordinated wage bargaining systems along German lines; and continental 
‘stakeholder capitalism’ was briefly fashionable in the 1990s. But these have not 
flourished and the thrust of policy since 1979 has been to reinforce the liberal--‐ market 
characteristics of the UK economy (Crafts 2007). In an era of globalisation and 
international trade and capital movements, the institutional landscape of UK capitalism 
provides the country with comparative advantages in services (especially financial 
services) and some innovative hi--‐tech manufacturing sectors; but also in much flexible, 
low cost manufacturing. 
 
Logically, the goal of policymakers should therefore be to preserve market shares in 
services and hi--‐tech industries while shifting gear to capture a larger segment of the 
medium and upper--‐medium tech industrial sectors currently dominated by Germany and 
Japan. This would entail developing capacities for high quality, semi--‐customised 
production techniques, perhaps accompanied by measures to close off the ‘low road’ 
option for firms currently choosing to compete on flexibility and price. 
 
However, as this paper has argued, DQP capabilities in Germany’s manufacturing 
industry are underwritten by several important economic relationships: companies 
securing long--‐term relationships with their owners; unions and employer associations 
playing an important role in the regulation of labour markets; firms being closely 
integrated into training systems and cooperating with each other through powerful 
industry associations. As these institutions are currently either absent or underdeveloped 
in the UK it might appear, at first glance, that these capacities may be difficult to foster on 
a broad platform within UK industry. 
 
A critical obstacle to developing capacities for co-ordination from a low base is that 
economic institutions are complementary – that is, they depend on interlocking 
institutions in other spheres in order to function. Quite radical reforms in a number of 
areas would therefore need to take place simultaneously. For example, it may be 
pointless developing long--‐term labour market relationships and training contracts in the 
absence of simultaneous corporate governance reform aimed at fostering longer--‐term 
investment horizons to reassure workers against skills redundancy. Policy development  
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 needs to take account of these complementarities and approach reform in a co-ordinated 
manner. 
 
Politically, such a reorientation of industrial policy would probably require a broad--‐ based 
coalition of employers, trade unions, financiers and policymakers behind it to succeed. 
Such coalitions have not proven particularly durable in the past. It would also be 
important not to destroy, or significantly undermine, those institutional capacities – such 
as flexible labour markets and a regulatory regime tolerant of takeovers --‐   which support 
the UK’s success in radically--‐innovative high technology sectors. 
 
Realistically, therefore, institutional reform in the UK would need to work with, rather than 
against, the grain, of an economic system that is primarily co-ordinated through markets 
(Coulter 2011). Building inter--‐firm co-ordination in ‘low--‐trust’ systems such as the UK is 
notoriously difficult as firms lack the ability to create stable agreements in the absence of 
powerful industry associations to come to their aid in disputes. The high degree of 
business co-ordination in Germany is, in part, a historical legacy of its powerful medieval 
guild system, which survived attempts by the Allies to dismantle it after WWII (Herrigel 
2000), and is not therefore easily replicable. The preference of UK firms has generally 
been towards looser, voluntary arrangements with little or no intervention from 
government beyond the provision of basic public goods (Wood 2001). The organisation of 
labour in the UK is also problematic, as UK trade unions are highly competitive with each 
other and wield power in certain sectors but lack the cohesion for more proactive 
strategies so employers are likely to block an enhanced role for them in wage bargaining 
or corporate restructuring (Crouch 1992). 
 
On the other hand, as noted earlier, other countries – notably Switzerland --‐   have been 
successful in pursuing high--‐value added production strategies with labour market and 
corporate governance systems that are closer to the UK than the German model in key 
respects. Börsch claims that Swiss firms in certain sectors are able to build sufficient 
coordination to support incremental innovation and DQP, subject to two conditions: first, 
they invest heavily in high--‐quality training; second, and more problematical for the UK, 
the more shareholder--‐oriented corporate governance system in Switzerland belies a 
relatively concentrated ownership structure that obstructs a market for corporate control. 
These two elements permit the kinds of commitments by workers and management 
necessary for DQP (Börsch 2007). 
 
Nevertheless, recent empirical work in micro--‐economics and game theory suggests that 
competitive markets are not necessarily inimical to building trust, provided that a minimal 
level of private information about competitors and potential collaborators is available to 
them (Huck et al 2012). This suggests that stronger business associations, which play a 
critical role in the German manufacturing industry as conduits for information and best 
practice, could provide an institutional ‘trigger’ for the UK to foster more co-ordination 
over things like demand--‐led vocational training, technology transfer and product 
development. They could also oversee, in partnership with central government, an 
overhaul of supply chains and provide more targeted support to medium--‐sized business – 
two areas currently seen as critical weaknesses by the Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills and the CBI. 
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 7.2 Policy innovations for the future 
Policymakers in the UK are currently examining the organisation of business to see 
whether better vertical and horizontal coordination by firms could improve economic 
outcomes (Heseltine 2012). The institutional framework for this is already in place, at 
least in embryo, as the UK possesses a long--‐standing network of Chambers of 
Commerce which provides business support and advice, and the government has 
recently introduced firm--‐led Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) to disburse state-
-‐provided development funding and develop strategic planning (Autumn Statement, HM 
Treasury 2012). 
 
Such organisations – Chambers and/or LEPs --‐   could potentially play a much greater role 
in co-ordinating firms’ activities than they do already. However, for this to happen, they 
would need to be revamped and given significant statutory powers and responsibilities. 
As things stand, the Chambers, although business--‐run, suffer from low membership, 
while the LEPs are regarded as creatures of central government and have already been 
the subject of turf--‐wars between business lobby groups. The fragmentation of business 
interest representation in the UK has been an issue of concern since the Devlin 
Commission of 1972, but there has been little effective action. 
 
A major obstacle to Chambers of Commerce assuming an effective coordinating role is 
their voluntary membership basis. In Germany, membership of the appropriate industry 
Chamber is compulsory in order to prevent free--‐riding. The recent Heseltine review has 
suggested that membership of UK Chambers could be made compulsory, but firms are 
likely to oppose this. Thus, in the absence of a compulsory element, an essential 
requirement for effective sectoral coordination would be for trade associations to be in a 
position to offer substantial selective benefits to member firms, to the extent that self-
-‐exclusion from such networks would entail significant costs. 
 
An obvious area that might benefit from greater collaboration among firms is vocational 
training as, despite repeated interventions by governments, the UK still suffers from a 
serious under--‐provision of skills. A model for reform is the Construction Industry Training 
Board, which overseas intra--‐sectoral co-ordination of training in the building industry 
funded through a compulsory training levy. Groups of employers in other business 
sectors could also benefit by collectively setting training goals and overseeing provision 
through business associations. This would offer the benefits of a demand--‐led training 
system while helping to avoid free--riding. However, given the uncertainties workers face 
in the UK’s flexible labour markets, trainees themselves would also need greater 
incentives to commit to enter the system. This could be achieved by sharply increasing 
the number of Advanced Apprenticeships at the expense of less demanding qualifications 
and linking these more explicitly to membership of and registration through professional 
bodies to guarantee their status. 
 
Central government also retains substantial scope for intervention in the sphere of 
finance and corporate governance, given the size of its balance sheet and critical role in 
setting the overall competitive and legal environment for firms. Recent proposals for a 
‘Business Bank’ to increase lending appear to be explicitly based on Germany’s KfW 
investment bank (Vince Cable, Statement to Parliament, 11th September 2012). 
However, this example of institutional borrowing may prove overly interventionist for UK 
businesses. The CBI has advocated instead an aggregation platform which would bundle 
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loans to kick--‐start a bond market for medium--‐sized businesses and provide alternatives to 
traditional bank financing. 
 
The recent report into the operation of UK equity markets by Professor John Kay is 
critical of its endemic short--‐termism, arguing that this reduces investment (Kay 2012). 
Kay has recommended reform of equity markets to prioritise Voice over Exit, in other 
words to secure closer involvement between asset managers and the companies they 
invest in through adjustments to corporate governance regulation. The LSE’s Growth 
Commission has also suggested regulatory changes (for example over equity voting 
rights) and tax reform (reducing the biased treatment of debt finance) in order to lengthen 
investment horizons (‘Investing for Prosperity’ Report of the LSE Growth Commission 
2012). Such action, if carefully designed, could improve the supply of patient capital to 
the parts of industry which need it while, ideally, not interfering in the ability of technology 
firms operating in fast--‐moving markets to redeploy capital swiftly to respond to rapidly 
changing market conditions. 
 
In summary, it would not be practical for the UK to adopt wholesale the institutions for co-
ordination of the German industrial model, and it should probably not try. Nevertheless, 
the financial crisis and faltering emergence from recession has laid bare the limitations of 
unfettered markets, and there may be substantial policy lessons to be learned from 
Europe’s manufacturing powerhouse. 
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